To these countries may be added Australia, the trade with which is increasing; and, as the Torres Straits route becomes better known, the psasing fratlic will doubtless be much augmented.
The mumber of square-rigged vessels which arrived at the Port of Singapore in 1874, amourted to 1773, and comprised 1,104,277 tons, of which 1027 vessels, of (42,740 tons, were British. Of those 1773 vessels, 994 were stea- mers, and comprised & (3,265 tons.
The value of the Imports for the year 1874 amounted to nearly £10,000,000 sterling, and the Exports to nearly £9,000,000 sterling.
When first occupied by Sir Stamford Raffles, 57 years ago, the island was inhabited by a few hundred Malay fishermen only; but at the time of the last census in 1871 the population had risen to about £10,000.*
The British trade passing through the Straits of Malacca, and the large commercial interests in the British Settlements of the Straits, must be protected in case of war by the Navy.
But ships of war cannot now keep the sea for long without going into harbour to coal, refit, and obtain supplies. Vessels cruising in the Straits of Malacca, or lower part of the China Sen, must resort for these purposes to Singapore, there being no other Naval Station nearer than Hongkong and Trincomalee, distaut respectively 1430 and 1490 miles.
"
In a memorandum. dated the 7th January, 1875, (copy enclosed) when serving in the War Office, I stated reasons why it is ofthe utmost importance that those harbours in our foreign **possessions, which would, in time of war, he The bases of operations for the Navy, should be "fortified more or less strongly, in proportion "to their importance, and the character of the "attack to which they are liable.' In that me- morandum, it was pointed out, that, unless the Naval Stations were thus fortified, our ships-of- war would either have to guard them, and thus leave our commerce at the mercy of the enemy, or else the harbours would be exposed to the at- tuck of an enemy's cruizers which would destroy the coal not required for its own use and burn the naval establishments. Our ships, thus de- prived of their coal supply, and of their means of repairing and refitting, would be unable to perform any duly or enterprize, so that by the capture of à coaling depôt an enemy might ren- der powerless the whole of the vessels of war on the station.
As regards Singapore, although there is no great naval establishment there, the mercantile docks in the harbour are available for, and are made use of by, our ships of war, and it is essen- rial, for naval purposes, that these should be efficiently protected.
* There is much difficulty in obtaining an accurate census of The Chinese population. It is believed that the total number fat
Iceeds that stated in text.
Necessity of the Coal- ing Station of Singa fortified. pore being property
Strategical import-
auce of Singapore.
3
The capture and destruction of these establish- ments would be futal moreover to imperial com- mercial interests. In the year 1871, 125,862 tons of coal were imported into Singapore, and the average quantity on hund is about 93,000 tons. Nearly a thousand steamers call at Singapore every year, the greater number of which require to take in a fresh supply of coal, before proceeding on their voyage. Not only, therefore, wodd these necessary supplies of coal be wanting, but, the Navy being rendered powerless to chase and capture the ernizers which any enemy, ----not neces- sarily an important maritinie power, ----would be certain to pit to sea, our mercantile marine in the adjacent waters would be much harassed, and might even be annihilated.
In addition to the consideration that Singa- pore is one of our chain of coaling stations, dividing the distance between those of Hong- kong and Ceylon, it also occupies a most ini- portant strategic position with respect to the command of the waters of the Eastern Archipe- Ingo.
As previously mentioned, the whole of the trade through the Straits of Malacca passes by Singapore, and upon referring to the Chart Plan 1) it will be seen that the width of Singa- pore Straits, from the island of St. John's to the opposite islands belonging to the Dutch, viz: Little Sambo and Pulo Blakan Padang, varies from 6,000 to 7,000 yards. If a work, therefore, were constructed on St. John's and armed with sufficiently powerful artillery, it would, in con- junction with a suitable vessel of war, close the Straits of Malacca against any non-armourelad vessels. An enemy's commercial traffic through the Straits of Malacca would thus be effectually stopped. Moreover, a squadron operating from Singapore could close the Straits of Sunda ayd an enemy's trade could thus be practically cut off from Eastern Asia,
I submit that it is of the utmost importance that Singapore should be secured by permanent defences against such attack as might be made upon it by a hostile cruizer or small squadron of vessels. The harbour would thus be made a secure base of operations for the fleet, and the centre of the commercial operations of Great Britain in the Eastern Archipelago would be protected.
On the other hand, improtected as Singapore
is at present, and prominently situated as it is on the world's high road, it would most certain- ly attract the attention of an enemy, especially if that enemy be an important maritime power; for, by its occupation, the important trade which we now carry on with China and the Eastern Archipelago, would be practically paralyzed.
526
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.